Limitation Act, 1908

In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

Explanation-A suit is instituted, in ordinary cases, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and, in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the Court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator.

Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court re-opens.

Any appeal or application for a revision or a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation- The fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court Division in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period of limitation may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.

Illustrations
(a) The right to sue for the hire of a boat accrues to A during his minority. He attains majority four years after such accruer. He may institute his suit at any time within the years from the date of his attaining majority.
(b) A right to sue accrues to Z during his minority. After the accruer, but while Z is still a minor, he becomes insane. Time runs against Z from the date when his insainity and minority cease.
(c) A right to sue accrues to X during his minority. X dies before attaining majority, and is succeeded by Y, his minor son. Time runs against Y from the date of his attaining majority.

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or proceeding or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all: but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Illustrations
(a) A incurs a debt to a firm of which B, C and D are partners. B is insane, and C is a minor. D can give a discharge of the debt without the concurrence of B and C. Time runs against B, C and D.
(b) A incurs a debt to a firm of which E, F and G are partners. E and F are insane, and G is a minor. Time will not run against any of them until either E or F becomes sane, or G attains majority.

Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period within which any suit must be instituted or application made.

Illustrations
(a) A, to whom a right to sue for a legacy has accrued during his minority, attains majority eleven years after such accruer. A has, under the ordinary law, only one year remaining within which to sue. But under section 6 and this section an extension of two years will be allowed him, making in all a period of three years from the date of his attaining majority, within which he may bring his suit.
(b) A right to sue for an hereditary office accrues to A who at the time is insane. Six years after the accruer A recovers his reason. A has six years, under the ordinary law, from the date when his insanity ceased within which to institute a suit. No extension of time will be given him under section 6 read with this section.
(c) A right to sue as landlord to recover possession from a tenant accrues to A, who is an idiot. A dies three years after the accruer, his idiocy continuing up to the date of his death. A's representative in interest has, under the ordinary law, nine years from the date of A's death within which to bring a suit. Section 6 read with this section does not extend that time, except where the representative is himself under disability when the representation devolves upon him.

Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it:

Provided thatwhere letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the time prescribed for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.

Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.
For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose, and the manager of any such property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.

In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the defendant has been absent from Bangladesh and from the territories beyond Bangladesh under the administration of the
1
[Government] shall be excluded.

ExplanationI - In excluding the time during which a former suit or application was pending, the day on which that suit or application was instituted or made, and the day on which the proceedings therein ended, shall both be counted.

ExplanationII - For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding.

ExplanationIII - For the purposes of this section misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.

In computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit for possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded.

Where any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of such right or of the title on which it is founded,
or where any document necessary to establish such right has been fraudulently concealed from him,
the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application-
(a) against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, or
(b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration,
shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby, or, in the case of the concealed document, when he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production.

ExplanationI - For the purposes of this section an acknowledgement may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time
for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to a set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or right.

ExplanationII - For the purposes of this section, “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf.

ExplanationIII - For the purposes of this section an application for the execution of a decree or order is an application respect of a right.

Provided that, save in the case of a payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by the person making the payment.

In the case of a continuing breach of contract and in the case of a continuing wrong independent of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the wrong, as the case may be, continues.

In the case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific injury actually results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury results.

IllustrationA owns the surface of a field. B owns the subsoil. B digs coal thereout without causing any immediate apparent injury to the surface, but at last the surface subsides. The period of limitation in the case of a suit by A against B runs from the time of the subsidence.

All instruments shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar.

Illustrations
(a) A Hindu makes a promissory note bearing a Native date only, and payable four months after date. The period of limitation applicable to a suit on the note runs from the expiration of four months after date computed according to the Gregorian calendar.
(b) A Hindu makes a bond, bearing a Native date only, for the repayment of money within one year. The period of limitation applicable to a suit on the bond runs from the expiration of one year after date computed according to the Gregorian Calendar.

Explanation- Nothing is an interruption within the meaning of this section, unless where there is an actual discontinuance of the possession or enjoyment by reason of an obstruction by the act of some person other than the claimant, and unless such obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant has notice thereof and of the person making or authorising the same to be made.

Illustrations
(a) A suit is brought in 1911 for obstructing a right of way. The defendant admits the obstruction, but denies the right of way. The plaintiff proves that the right was peaceably and openly enjoyed by him, claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right, without interruption from 1st January, 1890 to 1st January, 1910. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
(b) In a like suit the plaintiff shows that the right was peaceably and openly enjoyed by him for twenty years. The defendant proves that the plaintiff, on one occasion during the twenty years, ...

Where any land or water upon, over or from which any easement has been enjoyed or derived has been held under or by virtue of any interest for life or any term of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof, the time of the enjoyment of such easement during the continuance of such interest or term shall be excluded in the computation of the period of twenty years in case the claim is, within three years next after the determination of such interest or term, resisted by the person entitled, on such determination, to the said land or water.

IllustrationA sues for a declaration that he is entitled to a right of way over B's land. A proves that he has enjoyed the right for twenty-five years; but B shows that during ten of these years C, a Hindu widow, had a life interest in the land, that on C's death B became entitled to the land, and that within two years after C's death he contested A's claim to the right. The suit must be dismissed, as A, with reference to the provisions of this section, has only proved enjoyment for fifteen years.

At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.

30-31. [Repealed by section 3 and Schedule of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1930 (Act No. VIII of 1930).]
32. [Repealed by section 3 and Second Schedule of the Second Repealing and Amending Act, 1914 (Act No. XVII of 1914).]